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ABSTRACT
The year 1997 marked a significant change in the history of Hong Kong, for it
was returned to China after 156 years of British control, and became a Special
Administrative Region (SAR) of the People's Republic of China. While the territory
was still a British colony, it was considered a stronghold for liberal journalism in Asia.
Since the years leading to the handovcr, mainland Chinese officials have criticised the
Hong Kong press for abusing tlie laissez-faire media environment.

The flamboyant

style of the Hong Kong media contradicted the rigid, socialist ideology of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP). As the handover drew closer, the differences between the
social and political systems became even starker.

This thesis likens China's growing interference in the Hong Kong press and the

SAR's corresponding resistance to a game of 'tug-of war', with the meaning of the
word 'press' in 'press freedom' being narrowed down to 'print newspapers'. It explores
the controversy over Beijing's alleged infringements on the territory's press freedom, by
studying three cases involving mainland intervention that occurred during the first four
years after the handover. Meanwhile, it stresses that the future of a liberal press in
Hong Kong should neither be seen as gloomy nor impossible, by showing how local
defenders of a free press have responded to the three incidents. In addition, this thesis
provides an insight on the importance of preserving press freedom in Hong Kong, as
well a~ how China and the SAR can reach a compromise on this issue.

In contrast to other work in this area which often highlights the fact that Hong
Kong's press freedom has been increasingly under threat and would probably vanish
altogether, this thesis hopes to provide a new interpretation of this problematic issue in
an optimistic way. It also wishes to offer the reader a better understanding of what is
meant by press freedom in Hong Kong.
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INTRODUCTION
The future of press freedom in Hong Kong hung in the balance when on 151 July
1996, more than twenty reporters from the territory were detained in Beijing. They
were there to cover a story of a group of Hong Kong activists who intended to deliver a
petition to the Chinese government, protesting against the establishment of a provisional
legislature that would replace the elected body afler the handover (Fong, 1996). The
reporters were detained on the count of covering news 'illegally' without Chinese
consent, and were forced to write statements of confession and repentance.

The

journalists feared being blacklisted by the Chinese government, and were also worried
about China's stand on the territory's press freedom after this incident.

Four years have passed; with the journalists' fear being intensified by three
major attacks on the SAR media from China in the year 2000. These incidents raised
concerns about a gradual erosion of press freedom and the increasing practice of selfcensorship and censorship. Chapter One discusses these three cases in relation to the
highly debated topic of self-censorship and censorship.

While the Hong Kong

Journalists Association (HKJA) has repeatedly pointed out the existence of selfcensorship among the SAR news outlets in its annual reports since 1994, Liu ( 1997) and
Zeitlin (2001) attribute the toning down of China coverage in certain newspapers to
censorship exercised by the editorial and management level. Using the three cases, this
chapter argues that the arguments of both sides are valid. I will conduct a qualitative
analysis of how these cases were covered by two local Chinese-language newspapers
Apple Daily and Ming Pao (which are very different in nature from each other), as well
as the territory's leading English-language daily the South China Morning Post (SCMP).

These three papers are chosen due to the following reasons. Chinese-language
papers are read by the local Hong Kong population, which is made up of approximately
95 percent of ethnic Chinese (Central Intelligence Agency, 2001). Apple Daily is one of
the best-selling newspapers in the city, which is no mean feat for a paper that was
established in 1995 by pro-freedom entrepreneur Jimmy Lai Chi Ying. It is viewed as
'anti-China' since its confrontational attitude towards the Chinese government can be
seen in its comments and features. On the other hand, Ming Pao Is a more venerable
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paper which won the loyalty of the territory's intellectuals and middle-class. Although

it was once classified as 'hostile' by China's official Xinhua News Agency for its
aggressive coverage on the Tiananmen Square incident, it is observed to have started
softening its voice when the handover was approaching (Kahn, 1997).

Similarly, the

SCMP is believed to have been taking a less antagonistic stance towards Hong Kong's
new master (Stone, 1998, p.l60). It will be used as a main example to illustrate the
conflicts between the political directions of the press and the press owners' business
interests in the mainland.

In contrast, Chapter Tvw-'o explores the brighter side of the situation of press
freedom in Hong Kong. The inclusion of this chapter, which also explains the main
reason of writing this thesis, is due to the fact that little has been written to present the
future of press freedom in the SAR in an optimistic way. In fact, many Hongkongers
value freedom of the press as much as their western counterparts do, and some of them
have actually been putting great effort in fighting for press freedom. Evidence can be
cited in responses (both verbal comments and legal actions) from well-known local
press freedom advocates to the three incidents mentioned in Chapter One.

These

responses will appear in the first half of this chapter. The second half emphasises that
local media outlets generally support press freedom, regardless of their political
orientations. To achieve this, I will again employ the method of qualitative analysis,
with the focus on the editorials on two of those three cases by Apple Daily, Ming Pao
and the South China Morning Post.

To understand these press freedom advocates' persistence on fighting for press
freedom, it is necessary to understand the importance of preserving press freedom in
Hong Kong. Many critics who have touched on this topic tend to put their emphasis on
the economic factor. For instance, Neumann (1997) repeatedly stresses that the free
flow of infonnation, facilitated by minimal restrictions on the press, is essential for the
SAR to retain its status as an international financial market; Bowring (1997, p.23) and
Wrout (1997, p.l64) reach a consensus

tl1;~t

territory an advantage over Singapore,

e.,~-!t

Hong Kong's press freedom has given the
being the other's major competitor as a

regional hub in East Asia. Certainly, press freedom plays a vital part in the territory's
economic succ€:ss, but its significance is far more than that.

Introduction
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Neumann, Bowring ami Wrout's arguments will be developed in greater detail to
fonn part of Chapter Three, which assesses the importance of preserving press freedom
in Hong Kong based on the hypothetical scenario that press freedom was taken away

from the city. Certain relevant current affairs will be discussed so as to provide a new
dimension of examining the relationship between press freedom and the SAR's
economy. In addition, I will approach the topic by looking from the social and political
angles, at both a smaller and larger scale. Supportive arguments for the prediction of

the impacts of the loss of press freedom on the SARjoumalistic circle will draw heavily
from the studies by Chan, Lee and Lee ( 1996), which focus on Hong Kong journalists

during the transition period. When discussing the social and political implications on
the community as a whole, academic texts on Hong Kong's social and political history
such as works by McMillen (1993) and by Chan and Lee (1999) will be referred to.

The Chinese government's dismissive stance towards the importance of press
freedom shows up the still highly divergent views on this issue. It points to the Chinese
leaders' "dangerously insufficient understanding of Hong Kong" (Yahuda, 1997, p.204).

In his article, Yahuda identifies some fundamental differences between the two places

in order to illustrate how China could deepen its integration into the international
community if it understood the territory better.

Taking a similar approach, I will

elaborate on some of the differences and misunderstandings between China and Hong

Kong that have resulted in the 'tug-of-war' over press freedom in Chapter Four. In
particular, I will argue that Hong Kong is also responsible for this ongoing battle due to
its lack of understanding of its motherland.

These differences and misunderstandings will be classified into three mam
categories: political beliefs and ideologies, differing interpretations of important
concepts, and the media's perception of social responsibility. Ting's (1993) article on
China's economic development and Morikawa's (n.d.) study on China's political nature

are useful information sources for explaining China's apparently anti-western mentality.
George's (2000) book on Singapore's politics, which mentions some of the shared

attitudes between Singaporeans and mainland Chinese, will also be referred to. In terms
of articulating Hongkongers' general political beliefs, I will heavily draw my arguments

from literature specialising in identity fonnation and political movements in Hong Kong,
such as work by Thomas (1999) and work by Ma and Fung (1999).

Introduction
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By analysing China's own interpretation of the tenn 'freedom of the press',
Foster (1997) asserts that China's promise of press freedom to Hong Kong is "illusory".
However, this could be attributed to misunderstandings between China and Hong Kong

because of their different interpretations of 'press freedom'.

Observers who have

singled out other 'problematic' but important tenns include DeGolyer (1993, p.274),
Morikawa (n.d.) and Harris (1998, p.234). Aside from the Hong Kong definitions of

certain important tenns, what China also needs to understand is the SAR media's
perception of social responsibility. This idea came in the wake of the local media's
strong response to a speech given by Chinese President Jiang Zemin at the celebration
of the first anniversary of Macau's return to China. Jiang advised the media in both
Hong Kong and Macau to heed their social responsibility, of which the SCMP
concluded with three words: "toe the line" (Lee, No & Bruning, 2000). To the SAR

media, which are strongly western-influenced in general, this is certainly unacceptable.
Chapter Four will explore this topic at e. greater length by applying Chan, Lee and Lee's
(1996) studies on the professionalism of Hong Kong journalists and other relevant

literature.

Ch>~pter

One
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CHAPTER ONE
Casting a Shadow: China's Interference
During the first two and half years after the handover, the media in Hong Kong
seemed to be free of Chinese interference. There were neither major attacks on the
media, nor arrests of journalists. However, serious infringements occurred in the year
2000, where three incidents highlighted the precariousness of the territory's press
freedom.

This chapter aims at measuring the extent of China's intervention in the SAR's
media in the four years after 1997. It examines the practice of self-censorship and
censorship, which is a highly debated topic in Hong Kong. To achieve these, the three
cases will be discussed and analysed, with the main focus on the last case. In addition,
there will be a brief qualitative analysis of how these cases were covered by three local
newspapers: Apple Daily, South China Morning Post and Ming Pao.

The three major cases involved:
• Wang Fengchao, a Beijing official who warned the Hong Kong media against proTaiwan reporting on 121h April 2000.
• Chinese President Jiang Zemin, who lashed out at the SAR media on 28 1h October
2000.
• Willy Lam Wo Lap, a China editor who was forced to resign on 61h November 2000,
apparently for one of his 'sensitive' column on China.

These three cases are all evidence of interference from China and can be
classified into two categories: explicit and implicit intervention. Explicit intervention
refers to comments on and actions against the SAR's media by Chinese officials;
implicit interference can be seen in areas of press ownership, self-censorship and
censorship. The Wang Fengchao and President Jiang incidents clearly belong to the
first group, whereas Willy Lam's replacement belongs to the latter.

Chapter One

II

Implications of implicit interference- Case study of Willy Lam's removal from the
South China Morning Post
In fact, what was, and still is, really influencing the SAR journalistic circle is

implicit interference in editorial decisions. This is where Beijing's mostly subtle but
sometimes heavy-handed actions come in. The Hong Kong Journalists Association's
(HKJA) 1995 report documents various methods that the Chinese government has

employed to secure greater obedience from the Hong Kong's /aissez{aire media in the
run-up to the Chinese rule (Hong Kong Journalists Association [HKJA] & Article 19,
1995, p.23). These methods, also known as 'inside policies', which will be dealt with
below, were revealed in an interview with Kam Yiu Yu in October 1993 (HKJA &
Article 19, p.23). Kam was the former chief editor of the communist-controlled Hong

Kong daily Wen Wei Po. Indeed, evidence of such implicit interference from China can
be cited in the Willy Lam case, as well as several changes within the South China
Morning Post (SCMP or the Post) prior to the handover. It is necessary to provide

background information on the Lam case before any further discussion:
Background information on Willy Lam's removal
Veteran journalist Willy Lam Wo Lap quit the South China Morning Post (on 6ili
November 2000) rather than being sidelined. Having worked for Hong Kong's leading
English-language daily for over ten years, Lam resigned with disappointment and
dissatisfaction. He was notified that his job as the paper's China editor would be given

to fanner China Daily reporter Wang Xiangwei. Lam's replacement was believed to be
a result of a column he wrote in June 2000, where he alleged that mainland Chinese
government officials agreed to offer favours to 36 Hong Kong business tycoons if they
pledged their support for the Beijing-appointed SAR Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa
("Resign under pressure", 2000). This article became a target of the SCMP's major
shareholder Robert Kuok Hock Nien, who published a hostile letter in the paper

slanuning Lam's column as an exaggeration futl of "distortions and speculation"
("Regional briefing", 2000, p.l4).

The Post's chairman Kuok Khoon Ean (Robert

Kuok's son) emphasised that the organisational change was "purely an editorial
management decision", aiming at "expanding and diversifying the paper's China
coverage" ("Veteran journalist", 2000).

Chapter One
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Beijing's first application of the inside tactics on the Post could be seen in the
sale of the paper from media baron Rupert Murdoch to pro-China billionaire Robert
Kuok Hock Nien in September 1993. Few people believed that the takeover of the

SCMP by Robert Kuok was simply a swapping of masters. This was largely due to his
background- a Malaysian Chinese businessman with close ties to mainland officials and
extensive investments in China such as deluxe hotels, property development, and CocaCola bottling projects (Karp, 1993a, p.ll). Coupled with Kuok's acknowledgement of
the purchase being "facilitated by the Bank of China which provided temporary
bridging loans" (Stone, 1998, p.l61), an inside tactic that Kam refers to as "acting on
the 'economic bases"' of Hong Kong's media seems applicable in this case (HKJA &
Article 19, 1995, p.24). This particular method means that China will encourage pro-

Beijing investors to purchase a controlling stake in individual newspapers or media
groups on their behalf, in order to gain control of editorial policy (HKJA & Article 19,
p.24). The issue of press ownership has also led to a question of self-censorship and

censorship, which will be discussed later in this chapter.
Many were also bewildered as to the reason why Rupert Murdoch decided to
divest himself of the highly profitable daily, wondering about the political implications
of the deal. One of Murdoch's ambitions was to bring his Hong Kong-based regional
satellite broadcaster Star TV into the growing China market (Gilley, 2000, p.30). This
was certainly a big challenge for him owing to China's wariness of her citizens being
'corrupted' by pro-democracy Western ideologies.

Many analysts believed that

Murdoch had sold the SCMP in the fear that the paper's pro-British stance would thwart
his plan of entering China (Stone, 1998, p.l59). Indeed, according to the then SCMP

editor Jonathan Fenby, the Post was the "colonial mouthpiece, whose editor would go to
tea with the Governor once or twice a week and come back and write those editorials"
(Wrout, 1997, p.l63). Other moves to gain Beijing's favour included pulling the BBC's
24-hour news channel from Star TV, for it had upset China (Gilley, p.31). In addition,
Murdoch cancelled a book contract with Christopher Patten, Hong Kong's last governor
and a pro-democracy advocate. Murdoch openly admitted the political motivation
behind it: "We're trying to get set up in China. Why should we upset them?" (Gilley,
p.31).

Chapter One
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Although Robert Kuok has never been as blunt as Murdoch in terms of

admitting moves of befriending China for economic gains in the mainland, the changes
in the SCMP were somewhat perplexing. In April 1997, Feng Xiliang, the founding
editor of Beijing's official English-language newspaper China Daily, was appointed to
the Post as a 'consultant' (HKJA & Article 19, 1997, p.20). China Daily is notably the
mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Part) (CCP}, and is uncter the control of the
Central Committee's Propaganda Department (Haggart, 1992, p.50). This appointment

matched the characteristics of what Kam refers to as 'undercover agents', where loyal
CCP members, who are often experienced journalists of either official or semi~official
media organisations, are sent to work for newspapers in Hong Kong, usually in the
China news section (HKJA & Article 19, 1995, p.24). It sparked controversy about the
Post's editorial independence, although the then SCMP editor Jonathan Fenby declared

that a consultant would not affect his full authority to edit the paper (HKJA & Article 19,
1997, p.20). Something similar happened in the Willy Lam case, where former China
Daily business reporter Wang Xiangwei had taken over Lam's editorial position. Again,

this 'organisational change' worried the SAR media because the new China editor
would have operational and editorial control over all Post correspondents in Hong Kong
and China who cover Chinese affairs ("Veteran journalist", 2000).

It is also important to point out that Willy Lam was not the first 'problematic'
writer to be removed from the Post. Cartoonist Larry Feign's twelve-year-old strip The
World of Lily Wong was axed in May 1995, after it suggested a citizen who agreed that

the then Chinese Premier Li Peng "is a fascist, murderous dog" was killed (HK.JA &
Article 19, 1995, p.35). Similar to Lam, Feign had dealt with subjects which were of
extreme sensitivity to China. While the SCMP claimed that the decision to scrub the
strip was for financial reasons, Feign contended that it did not make sense for the editor
to cut costs by dropping his most popular feature (Cohen, 1997, p.4). It is hard to
believe that the removal of two gutsy columnists and the appointment of two mainland

'consultants' are pure coincidence. In fact, the recurrences are more likely to be a
reinforcement of one alarming signal: toe the line or you are out.

The Chinese government not only dedicates a particular set of policies to dealing
with the Hong Kong media, but also applies the same tactics that it uses to gain control

of the mainland's media to the SAR from time to time. Once again, this observation can
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be proved by examining the Willy Lam case. After his resignation from the Post, Lam
revealed in an 'Inside Media' program that editors of the newspapers receive subtle
messages from Beijing, where "a media magnate might be invited to dinner with a high
ranking government official who just 'casually' makes a critical comment about a
certain article" (Arvidson, 2000). This emulates what the Chinese leaders do to gain

control of the mainland media, where they arrange: regular meetings at which the chief
editors are told what they should or should nut publish (Haggart, 1992, p.52). To

Beijing, giving frequent advice is actually an act of benevolence. According to Haggart
(1992, p.53), the Propaganda Department will simply remove obstinate chief editors
they find hard to tolerate. Apparently, many people, including Lam himself, believe
that that is what happened to him.

Willy Lam's removal was certainly a blow to the freedom of the SAR's media.
It intensified the conflict between press ownership and personal business interests, as

discussed above; it also led to a current debate on self-censorship and censorship in the
media, which has been running since several years before the handover. Chan and To
(1999, p.467) observe that as 1997 was approaching, the Beijing government rose as an

alternative power centre in Hong Kong. As a result, many local journalists adopted the
practice of self-censorship on China's coverage out of ensuring job-security. A study
on local journalists' hesitation on criticising China revealed that there were journalists
who acknowledged apprehension (Chan, Lee & Lee, 1996, p.!19). Chan, Lee and Lee
(1996, p.120) suggested the figures were "somewhat of an understatement" since self-

censorship was considered "professionally despicable". Another strong .mpporter of
this argument is the HKJA, which has repeatedly confirmed the existence of self-

censorship among the Hong Kong media in its annual reports on freedom of expression,
as well r.s its annual anniversary magazines.

On the other hand, there are those who strongly oppose the claim that 'selfcensorship poses the greatest threat to Hong Kong's press freedom'.

Liu (1997)

suggests that frontline journalists seldom censor themselves. Their 'sensitive' stories
are usually 'spiked' by the editorial or management level.

Thus, what has been

disturbing the territory's journalistic circle is actually "plain old censorship". Prior to

the handover, there were several incidents to support this argument. For example,

SCMP columnist Christine Loh Kung Wai apparently touched on the controversial sale

IS

Chapter One

of the Post to Robert Kuok in one of her original articles. The article raised questions
about press freedom in Hong Kong and was rejected by the daily's editors (Karp, 1993b,
p.94). Loh, who was also an outspoken liberal in the colonial legislature, defended

herself against the accusation of criticising the sale. Meanwhile, she admitted that it
would be naiVe to assume the purchase was purely for commercial reasons, simply by
looking at Kuok's business background (Karp, 1993b, p.94).

Loh's counterpart

Margaret Ng encountered the same problem, where her column on press freedom was
rejected by the Post during the transition period of the purchase (Karp, !993a, p.ll ).

Lam's removal is a more recent example that can be used to further enforce the
validityofLiu's argument. Lam himself was an editor, in the position to decide what
gets published and what does not. Moreover, he was not subject to the same editorial
checks and vetting that junior journalists are. This is why his article on Beijing's
meeting with Hong Kong tycoons got published without being scanned and censored. If
it was, the skirmish would not have happened and he would not have been stripped of

his editorial post. However, Lam was subject to censorship of a different kind - from
the management level. Instead of having his article spiked or amended, he was simply
removed from the China news desk.

Taking the same stance as Liu is Arnold Zeitlin, the chairman of the Freedom
Forum Asian Centre.

Zeitlin, as cited in Kubiske (2000, p.38), arg'les that self-

censorship is a problem in many countries, and that there is a lack of substantial
evidence to demonstrate that self-censorship on China coverage is widely practiced in
Hong Kong (Zeitlin, 2001). He defends the professionalism of the territory'sjoumalists,

saying that they have covered 'sensitive issues' in a ''balanced manner" (Zeitlin, 2001 ).

While there might not be a preponderance of evidence, the word 'balanced'

already implies a sense of compromise. This sense of compromise entails either selfcensorship or censorship, but no one can put a finger on what the situation really is.
Therein lies the question of whether the 'balanced' report was brought about by an order
from the editorial level, or through veiled threats. The ambivalent concept of 'being
balanced' can be examined by comparing how Willy Lam's removal was covered by the

SCMP, Apple Daily and Ming Pao.

Chapter One
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Both Apple Daily and Ming Pew accompanied the news of Lam's resignation
with reports of the 'war of words' he had with Robert Kuok in June 2000. The two

dailies also ran articles on the opinions of certain free press advocates, who generally
reached a consensus that the removal was politically motivated. For instance, Apple

Daily quoted the Hong Kong Journalists Association, which suspected that Lam's
"abrupt departure" might involve "pressure from the outside" (Wong, 2000a). The

association was worried that the event would affect the international image of Hong
Kong. In addition to quoting the HKJA, Ming Pao quoted local democrat Martin Lee

Chu Ming, who demanded an explanation from the Post for its "suspicious move"
("Resign under pressure", 2000). It is noteworthy that both papers published Willy
Lam's announcement, which said that Lam himself felt "distorted" about the Post's
decision oiremoving him from the China desk. He believed that the event would have
a dulling effect on the territory's press freedom (Wong, 2000a).

On the contrary, the SCMP's coverage on this 'internal affair' was rather muted.
It emphasised that the replacement of Lam was an organisational reshuffle ("Enhanced

coverage", 2000), and felt sorry about his subsequent resignation ("Veteran journalist",
2000). The Post did r.ot mention anything about the skirmish between Willy Lam and
Robert Kook, nor did it reflect any sceptical views from anyone. It appears that if the

Post adopted a policy of self-censorship or censorship with regard to its coverage.
Which one it exactly was, only those at the Post would know.

Beijing, press proprietor and coverage- Case studies of Wang Fengchao's
Remarks and President Jiang's 'lecture'

The topic on self-censorship or censorship is often linked to the growing trend of
independent newspapers being bought over by businessmen with substantial economic
interests in the mainland (HKJA & Article 19, 2001, p.II). In the light of Robert
Kook's background, it is no surprise that every internal change within the SCMP is
perceived as proprietorial influence. Indeed, the relationship between the proprietor's
principles and the paper's political direction is sometimes reflected in the paper's
coverage. A comparison among the headlines of the reports on the Wang and Jiang
events by Apple Daily, the SCMP and Ming Pao appear to be a good illustration.

Chapter One
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Background information on Wang Fengchao 's remarks
At a seminar organised by the Hong Kong Federation of Journalists, deputy
director of China's local liaison office (formerly the Xinhua News Agency Hong Kong

Branch) Wang Fengchao issued a grave warning to Hong Kong's media regarding the
coverage of Taiwan's political status. He asse:1ed that "the media should not treat
speeches and views which

advocat~

Taiwan's independence as normal news items, nor

should they report them like normal cases of reporting the voices of different parties"
(Ma & Political Desk, 2000). He went on to say that the local media are responsible
for upholding the integrity and sovereignty of the People's Republic of China (Ma &
Political Desk, 2000). It is believed that Wang was referring to an interview conducted

with Taiwan's pro-independence Vice-president Annette Lu Hsiu Lien by Hong Kongbased Cable Television. He insisted that his remarks had nothing to do with press
freedom.

Background infonnation on President Jiang's 'lecture'

In a meeting with the SAR Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa in October 2000,
Chinese President Jiang Zemin lashed out at Hong Kong journalists when he was asked

whether it was an 'imperial order' for Tung to serve a second tenn.

In an

uncharacteristic outburst of anger, President Jiang accused the journalists of undue
aggressive questioning, saying that they lacked knowledge and kept asking "simple and
narve" questions (Ching, 2000). He also criticised their professionalism, saying that
the only thing good about them was that they could run faster then their Western
counterparts (Ching, 2000). President Jiang's tirade not only surprised the media and

politicians in the territory, but also became international news.

Headlines of the reports on the Wang case by
• Apple Daily: "Beijing official gruffly threatens media" ("Beijing official", 2000)
• SCMP: "Media warned on Taiwan reports" (Ma & Political Desk, 2000)
• Ming Pao: "Wang Fengchao puts limitation to Taiwan reports" ("Wang Fengchao",
2000)

Headlines of the reports on the Jiang case by
• Apple Daily: "Jiang Zemin blows his top - a complete indelicacy" (Ching, 2000)
• SCMP: "Jiang attacks 'naive' media" (Kong & Cheung, 2000)

Chapter On-=
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• Ming Pao: "Support different from imperial order, says Jiang" (Leung, 2000).
While the headlines by the SCMP and Ming Pao are not provocative, the ones
by Apple Daily stand out as the bluntest and the most emotional among the three. They
clearly reflect the paper's marked antipathy and opposition towards Wang's advice and
Jiang's 'lecture'. A brief qualitative analysis oft he contents of these reports will further
single out the uniqueness of Apple Daily from the other two papers.

Analysis of reports on the Wang case
Apple Daily began the report with rather strong statements: "The 'gunfire' from

Beijing's cannonade pointing towards Taiwanese independence has finally spread to
Hong Kong ... Wang Fengchao warned the Hong Kong media in a fiery manner ... "
("Beijing official", 2000). Aside from employing strong words, the paper devoted
about half of the article to reporting the opinions of several local press freedom
defenders.

While Ming Pao and the SCMP also ran reports on several free press

advocates' responses towards the issue, the number of paragraphs they devoted was
significantly less than in Apple Daily. Furthennore, the two dailies simply narrated the
event in a factual manner, without highlighting the conflict.

Analysis of reports on the Jiang case
Among the three newspapers, Apple Daily had the most detailed report of the

event, in which an overwhelmingly large part was composed of direct quotes from Jiang
Zernin. To further emphasise Jiang's fierceness towards the SARjoumalists, the paper

described his gestures and facial expressions with phrases that carry negative
connotations, such as "blustered with grouchiness", "ranted af', "scowled at" and
"spoke with increasing wrath". On the other hand, reports by Ming Pao and the SCMP

were not as detailed, and terms with derogatory meanings were not found.

Some may attribute the differences in the style of both the headlines and
contents to fair and objective reporting as opposed to sensationalism in Apple Daily's
case. However, the factor of owner's influence may not be ruled out when one looks at
the history and changes of the three papers.
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The changes in the SCMP newsroom, as mentioned above, are deemed as
politically motivated moves aimed at toning down the paper's coverage on Chinese
affairs.

Many believe that Ming Pao has also been making changes for the same

reasons. Being identified as Hong Kong's most influential

n~wspaper,

Ming Pao was a

thorn in the side of the Beijing government. It was once classified as "hostile" by the

Xinhua News Agency (China's de facto embassy in Hong Kong), due to its aggressive
coverage of the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 (Kahn, 1997). Malaysian-Chinese
timber and publishing magnate Tiong Hiew King purchased the daily in 1995, partly

because of his "patriotic instincts" and his desire to "make contributions to the Chinese
people" (Kahn, 1997). The word 'Chinese' is ambiguous, since no one can be sure if

Tiong was referring to the Hong Kong Chinese or the mainland Chinese. However,
several changes in Ming Pao following Tiong's takeover seem to indicate that his
"contributions" are geared towards the mainland Chinese.

Firstly, a senior opinion writer from Shanghai who once worked for a mainland
government propaganda department joined the daily (Kahn, 1997). Secondly, the paper
has begun following the style of mainland papers, referring to Taiwan as a province of
China. Thirdly, coverage of dissent in the mainland has been significantly reduced, and
stories on Chinese politics have been discouraged (Kahn, 1997). Ming Pao reporters

noticed the editorial changes, and one of them said, "The editors feel more comfortable
if we just wait for the official version to come out" (Kahn, 1997). Those who were
disgruntled with the changes, simply left the paper. The daily's former political editor

Lai Pui Yee, who was also a former chairperson of the HKJA, once commented that
there were strange things going on at Ming Pao and she did not want to be part of it
(Kahn, 1997).

The envirornnent in Apple Daily is an entirely different story. It is not surprising,
for the pro-democracy paper's owner Jimmy Lai Chi Ying is known as a solid defender
of press freedom. His brashness was once compared to that of Allen H. Neuharth, the
founder of USA TODAY and the Freedom Forum (Sandeen, 1998). According to Lai,
his bold move of entering the highly competitive local newspaper market was

encouraged by the increasing kowtowing stance of the media, which led to a drop in
readership (Lai, 1996, p.256). He saw an opportunity for a new independent voice and
therefore launched Apple Daily. Lai goes against the trend of self-censorship and
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censorship, encouraging criticism even in the coverage of Chinese news (Steinberger,
1996).

Despite the fact that his Giordano clothing stores in China were forced to close

down temporarily after his magazine Next published an article insulting the then
Chinese Premier Li Peng (Steinberger, 1996), the flamboyant entrepreneur has never

become submissive.

Both the daily and the magazine have continued lambasting

China's leadership as well as satirising the SAR government. However, there is one
price that Jimmy Lai is still paying, which once again confirms the existence of Beijing
interference. The reporters of both Apple Daily anc' the Next magazine have been

refused official accreditation to go to the mainland to cover news. This is attributed to
Beijing's carrot-and-stick tactics: while 'friendly' journalists will be invited for

briefings and be granted speedy access to information, those 'unfriendly' ones will get
blacklisted or even punished (HKJA & Article 19, 1997, p.53).

Conclusion
It is undeniable that the Chinese authorities had been attempting to intervene in

the operation of the Hong Kong's media during the first four years after the handover.

With both explicit and implicit methods, Beijing had exerted pressure on some media
organisations, which gradually led to an erosion of the SAR's press freedom. Evidence

of such influence can be cited in three major incidents occurrt:d in the year 2000,
namely Wang Fengchao 's remarks, Jiang Zemin' s 'lecture' and Willy Lam's removal.
A brief qualitative analysis of how these cases were covered by Apple Daily,

South China Morning Post and Ming Pao suggests that self-censorship was neither a
myth nor the greatest enemy to press freedom in Hong Kong. Censorship exercised by
the editorial and management level also accounted for the toning down of certain local

newspapers' coverage on China, with the economic interests of the papers' owners in
the mainland being a main factor.

While the existence of Beijing's interference is certain, the survival of prodemocracy Apple Daily shows that press freedom in the SAR has no lack of sunshine.

In fact, Apple Daily is not fighting alone. Chapter Two will introduce more defenders
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of press freedom in the territory, so as to examine the result of the 'tug-of-war' in the

first four years after the handover.
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CHAPTER TWO
Looking on the Bright Side: Hong Kong's Resistance
Chapter one paints a rather gloomy picture of press freedom in Hong Kong
during the first four years after the handover. However, the identification of major
incidents and the acknowledgement of the existence of both censorship and selfcensorship do not necessarily signal that this thesis takes a pessimistic stance towards
the issue.

As it.s title indicates, there has been a tug-of-war over the SAR's press

freedom.

The mainland's intimidation, which has been illustrated in the previous

chapter, is only one side of the story.

This chapter seeks to point out that there are people in Hong Kong who have
constantly pulled the rope from the other side, fighting for the freedom of the press.
Arguments will be based on responses from well-known press freedom advocates to the
three controversial incidents which occurred in the year 2000: Wang Fengchao's
remarks, President Jiang's 'lecture' and Willy Lam's removal. These prominent figures
include pro-democracy legislators Martin Lee and Emily Lau, the former SAR Chief
Secretary for Administration Anson Chan, as well as the Hong Kong Journalists
Association. In addition, a qualitative analysis of the editorials on the first two cases by

Apple Daily, Ming Pao and the South China Morning Post will be conducted, in order
to articulate one argument: while different local newspapers might hold different
political directions, all of them show no tolerance towards Beijing's verbal attacks.

The Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA)
Founded in 1968, the Hong Kong Journalists Association has emerged as an
outspoken pressure group that dedicates its effort in defending press freedom and
dealing with issues related to the journalism profession (Chan, Lee & Lee, 1996, p.32).
It has been recognised by many foreign organisations as a "vocal and respectable force"

in these aspects (Lau, 1998, p.30). This is no exaggeration when one looks at how the
association responded to Wang Fengchao's warning to the SAR media regarding reports
on Taiwan issues.
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The HKJA refused to accept Wang's 'advice', for it believed that damage would

be done to the media's independence and credibility (Hong Kong Journalists
Association [HKJA] & Article 19,2000, p.6). It also strongly denounced the comments

as a breach of China's promise to retain Hong Kong's administrative autonomy after the
handover (HKJA & Article 19, p.6).

To further express its antipathy against the

remarks, the association wrote to Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji, hoping that Zhu would
help prevent any recurrences of similar 'advico' from Beijing ("The HKJA", 2000). In

addition, it staged a 24-hour industry-wide signature campaign in order to convey "the
opposition of Hong Kong journalists being asked to be tools to promulgate state

policies", and to show their "commitment to editorial independence" ("The HKJA",
2000).

Regarding President Jiang's 'lecture', the association condemned any strong
remarks from the central leadership like Jiang's, as they would put the media under
direct pressure (HKJA & Article 19, 2001, p.9).

While Jiang accused the SAR

journalists of always asking simple and nai've questions, the HKJA chairperson Mak
Yin Ting argued that the questions posed were "sensible and legitir.dte" (Ron, 2000).

She went on to explain that whether Tung Chee Hwa was 'the emperor's choice for reelection' was certainly related to the implementation of the 'one country, two systems'
principle. The journalists simply represented the people of Hong Kong to express one
oftheir main concerns (Ron, 2000). Furthermore, Mak suspected that Jiang deliberately

overreacted in order to conceal his reluctance to clarify Beijing's stance on the reelection ("It's their responsibility", 2000).

The HKJA has been sensitive to China's attempts to intervene in the SAR media.
It doubted that Lam's abrupt departure was due to an internal reshuffling of staff.

Instead, the HKJA believed that "pressure from the outside" was involved, which aimed
at making the South China Morning Post's China coverage more acceptable to the
Beijing government (Wong, 2000a).

Mak Yin Ting was worried that the Post's

decision would signal an erosion of editorial freedom of Hong Kong's English-language

newspapers, which would in tum affect the territory's international image (Wong,
2000a).
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The HKJA has put in an impressive amount of effort to safeguard press freedom
in Hong Kong. It has not only showed overwhelming support for the local journalists
with regard to attacks from Chinese officials, but also suggested ways and means in its

annual reports as to what could be done to preserve freedom of expression in the
territory.

Martin Lee Chu Ming- Head of the Democratic Party in Hong Kong
Martin Lee has been one ofthe most outspoken advocates of democracy in Hong

Kong. He has always criticised China's human rights record as well as its communistic
state policies which, in his opinion, would have adverse effects on the SAR. Viewed as
a "subversive" by the Beijing government and as a "future martyr" by the territory, Lee
sees himself as "a man of principle", who will "stand by what he believes is right for
Hong Kong" (Lee, 1996, p.233). Undoubtedly, press freedom has been a fundamental

element to the success of the territory in Lee's eyes.
While Lee appreciates Beijing's promise of 'one·country, two systems', he has a
constant fear of the mainland abandoning this principle which ensures Hongkongers'
rights and freedoms. This was reflected in his views towards Wang Fengchao's remarks,

which he saw as an infringement on the SAR media's freedoms, thus rendering it an
empty promise ("Different responses", 2000). Lee encouraged SAR journalists to try
their best to safeguard this principle (Ma & Political Desk, 2000), and condemned

Wang for providing the media a classification of whom they can and cannot interview
(Ma & Li, 2000). With reference to the belief that Wang Fengchao was voicing his

displeasure over the television interview with Taiwan's pro·independence Vicepresident Annette Lu Hsiu Lien, Martin Lee expressed his antipathy in a satirical
statement: "If Annette Lu Hsiu Lien is today's target, then the Democratic Party will be

tomorrow's" ("Various responses", 2000).
The pro-democracy legislator's response to President Jiang's 'lecture' was even
blunter. He described Jiang's outburst as an act of "tainting Chinese people's honour"
(Wong & Chan, 2000), for he dispraised the Hong Kong reporters in a foreigu language
(English) and compared their professionalism with that of a veteran Caucasian journalist
(Jiang eulogised American journalist Mike Wallace, who has had sixty years journalistic

I
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experience and interviewed Jiang for the CBS's 60 Minutes). Lee supported the SAR
reporters, saying that they were asking the questions in good faith (Wong & Chan,
2000). Other members of the Democratic Party added that Jiang's outbreak revealed
Beijing's "subconscious" tightening of its control over Hong Kong ("April 5 Action",
2000).

Lee also expressed his concern over Willy Lam's removal. He revealed that he

was a loyal reader of Willy Lam's, whose columns, according to Lee, had consistently
provided "accurate information" ("Editorial independence", 2000). He was dissatisfied
with the SCMP's decision, saying that the newspaper owed the public a justifiable
explanation for this "suspicious" move ("Editorial independence", 2000).

Given his intrepid and pro-democratic spirit, it is no surprise that Martin Lee and
his colleagues from the Democratic Party have been refused any dialogue with the
Chinese government (Lee, 1996, p.234). Lee once revealed his fear for his party as well
as the local press being pressured under Chinese rule. Nevertheless, he confidently

promised that the Party would "soldier on" and "continue to be the voice of Hong
Kong" ("Hong Kong's Martin Lee", 1997).

Emily Lau Wai Hing- Head of tbe Frontier
Emily Lau has been no less enthusiastic than Martin Lee when it comes to
fighting for press freedom. Being a former journalist and former chairperson of the
HKJA, Lau fully understands the concerns of local reporters, and is renowned for her
outspokenness.

Lau was disgruntled with Wang Fengchao's Taiwan remarks, sa)'lng, "if
mainland officials were to point a finger here and there, telling us what we should do
and what we should not do, it would have a big impact on Hong Kong's press freedom"
(Ma & Li, 2000). She added that the remarks had an implication of urging the media to
exercise self-censorship ("Anger erupts", 2000). Together with other members of the
Frontier (another pro-democracy party), Lau staged a demonstration outside the Central
Government Offices, calling for the SAR government to defend press freedom ("Anger
erupts", 2000).
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Also when it came to commenting on Chinese President Jiang Zomin, the
legislator spoke without reserve. Lau said that Jiang's behaviour in the outbreak had

not been "statesmanlike", suspecting that his original motivation was to "maintain the
fake belief' that the SAR Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa was elected (Hon, 2000).
She added that Jiang mishandled the situation and thus resulted in an "indelicate
perfonnance" (Wong & Chan, 2000).

As for Willy Lam's removal, Emily Lau believed that it was directly related to
his skinnish with Robert Kuok in June 2000. She referred to the event as a "nail in [the]
coffin" for both press freedom and the SCMP's credibility (Goff, n.d.). She openly

criticised the daily's political inclination, claiming that the incident signalled a tendency
to buck under criticism from "the rich and the powerful".
Anson Cban-Fang On Sang - Former Cbief Secretary for Administration in Hong
Kong
Like Martin Lee and Emily Lau, Anson Chan is a democracy advocate. Before
her retirement in April 2001, Chan won the popularity of most Hongkongers. She was
honoured as 'Hong Kong's conscience' for her forthright manner in standing up for the

interests of the community, campaigning for a wide range of rights and freedoms that
the citizens have enjoyed.

As a defender of freedom, Chan responded promptly and finnly to Wang
Fengchao's remarks: "Press freedom is guaranteed by the Basic Law as are the
freedoms of speech and publication", and therefore the Hong Kong media is "free to

comment and report on all matters of current interest" in accordance to the SAR's miniconstitution (Ma & Political Desk, 2000). She further pacified the anxiety caused by
Wang's comments, saying the SAR government perfectly understood the importance of
press freedom to an open and free society like Hong Kong. Chan promised that the
government would work with the media and the whole community to protect their rights
and freedoms ("Mrs Chan", 2000).

Although the Chief Secretary did not make any specific comment on President

Jiang's 'lecture' and Willy Lam's removal, she once again put great emphasis on press

-'" - "'&'
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freedom shortly after Lam's departure. In a conference on 'Press, Power & Politics:
Asia' held by the Freedom Forum, Anson Chan pointed out that press freedom is a

"bedrock guarantee" of Hongkongers' way of life, and is imbedded in their "hearts and
minds" (Fiiess, 2000). She incisively asserted that a free press must be accepted "warts

and all. You can't have a virtually free press or a more-or-less free press. That's like a
little pregnant" (Fiiess, 2000).

Occasional participants and foreign support

The groups and individuals mentioned above are the more vocal and 'die-hard'
defenders of press freedom. In fact, there are also participants who occasionally stand
up for the territory's interests. For example, Wang Fengchao's remarks outraged many
organisations, such as the Bar Association, human rights activists and university
students. They reached a consensus that Wang's warning was unacceptable because a
free press is "an inalienable right" ofHongkongers (Hon, Shiu & No, 2000). Moreover,
student representatives from City University, Shue Y an College and the University of

Hong Kong marched to the Liaison Office, protesting against Beijing's interference.
They declared that the media would refuse to be the "government mouthpiece", and
demanded a public apology from Wang ("University students", 2000).

It is important to point out that the local press freedom defenders have also been

gaining support from the international community. Since its return to China on 151 July
1997, Hong Kong has been placed "under the international limelight", being monitored
for China's implementation ofthe 'one country, two systems' formula (Liu, 1998, p.63).
The local International Relations Sub-committee has been invited to give speeches in

seminars held by many foreign organizations, such as the International Federation of
Journalists and the Canadian Committee to Protect Journalists (Liu, 1998, p.64).

According to the sub-committee, the support it receives has been enormous. Indeed,
Britain and the United States entered the row over Wang Fengchao incident, saying that
they were very concerned and shocked by the Chinese official's comments ("America
shocked", 2000).
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Analysis of newspapers' editorials
No matter how stalwart these free press advocates are, their efforts would have

been futile if the local news agencies themselves were not concerned or firm enough
about the issue. Chapter One has shown the reader a worrying sign, whereby among
three local newspapers Apple Daily, Ming Pao and the South China Morning Post, the
first paper seemed to be the only one which is tough and critical on China regardless of

Beijing's interference.

As a matter of fact, this observation is only valid to the

comparison of their report sections. The following qualitative analysis of the three
dailies' editorials on Wang and Jiang incidents, seeks to emphasise that all of them see

press freedom as a fundamental value.
Apple Daily
As mentioned in Chapter One, Apple Daily's owner Jimmy Lai has been a
tenacious defender of press freedom. Despite the legal actions that China has taken
against him, Lai continues publishing critical coverage of China. He even hired the

dauntless columnist Chan Ya, whose series of articles criticising China was dropped by
her former editor at Express Daily News which eventually led to the termination of her
contract (Steinberger, 1996). Lai's persistence in standing by his principle "fight for

freedom and democracy" is often reflected in the paper's editorials.

Since the day after Wang Fengchao made his remarks, Apple Daily serialised its

concern over the issue in its editorials on three consecutive days. The daily began the
first editorial with strong comments that reflected its disapproval of Wang's advice: "It

will not only curtail the media's editorial independence as well as press freedom, but
will also tum 'one country, two systems' into an empty promise. Thus, both the SAR's
media and citizens should say 'no' to Beijing's advice" (Lo, 2000a). In the latter part of
the editorial, the paper modestly requested the Beijing government to understand the
belief that "accurate and objective reporting is beneficial to everyone" (Lo, 2000a).

The second editorial was written from a historical perspective, where Apple
Daily commented that Wang's remarks simply reflected the Beijing government's

persistence in cracking down on dissent against official state policies, many of which
had resulted in catastrophic mistakes (Lo, 2000b).

The paper cited as one of the
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examples - the 'Great Leap Forward' launched by the CCP government in the 1950s,

where rice fields were ploughed to make way for steel foundries and tractor factories in
order to push ahead in China's drive to industrialization. As a result, millions were
starved to death due to a sharp decrease in the supply of food, and the situation was
further confounded by natural disasters. The aim of the editorial was to emphasise that

the freedom to publish objective and accurate reporting of different voices is
fundamental to reducing any country's chances of making such mistakes (Lo, 2000b).

Apple Daily wrote the third editorial in response to the Local National People's

Congress deputies Ng Hong Mun and Wu Wai Yung's accusation that the SAR media

had been overreacting to Wang Fengchao's remarks. They shared the same view that
the remarks were not a promulgation of a piece of law, but "advice out of good
intentions for the media" (Kong, 2000). The paper contended that the media responded
pertinently and "there was no way they should have kept quiet" (Lo, 2000c).

It

perceived Wang's comments as a clear threat to the territory's press freedom, which
would turn the media into a machine for government propaganda. According to Apple
Daily, the comments also defied the Hong Kong media's perception of 'social

responsibility', which is to provide their readers with different kinds of opinion so as to
enable them to make informed judgments (Lo, 2000c).

As compared to its strong response to Wang Fengchao's remarks, Apple Daily

seemed more moderate towards President Jiang's 'lecture'. While one may accuse
Apple Daily of being afraid of taking on Jiang, the fact is that Wang Fengchao had

issued a 'warning' to the Hong Kong media, whereas President Jiang was merely
criticising the professionalism of the SAR journalists. In its editorial, Apple Daily
commended Jiang's ability of previously handling such questions with ease, which he
had shown before (Lo, 2000d).

The paper presumed that Jiang's uncharacteristic

outbreak was due to the extreme sensitiveness of the 'one country, two systems'
principle to both Beijing and Hong Kong.

It suggested that Jiang's anger was

understandable in the sense that the question of 'the SAR leader being appointed by

Beijing' would have a negative impact on international confidence in the 'one country,
two systems' principle. Nevertheless, Apple Daily asserted that this was one of the
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main concerns in the SAR and the question was therefore valid. In the paper's opinion,
the SARjournalists posed a fair question, but Jiang did not answer in a thoughtful way.

These editorials clearly show Apple Daily's political stance: pro-democracy but
not anti-China. However, China does not seem to understand the fact that there is not
necessarily any conflict between the two positions. This topic will be further explored
in Chapter Four.

MingPao
While Ming Pao's reports seem to be more 'fair' and 'objective' as compared to
that of Apple Daily, the paper is capable of being quite critical in its editorials when it
comes to standing up for its beliefs.

Ming Pao likened Wang Fengchao's remarks to a "depth bomb thrown at the
Hong Kong press" ("Beijing must not", 2000). It pointed out that such advice not only
infringed upon the territory's freedom of the press, but also went against 'one country,
two systems', Beijing's pledge to the SAR.

The paper suggested some negative

consequences that might occur if China was to go back on its words, such as a drop in
both local and international confidence in the promise, and Hong Kong being a less
convincing model for Taiwan in China's hopes of reunification.

The daily showed its emphasis on the promise of 'one country, two systems'
again in its editorial on President Jiang's 'lecture'. Ming Pao asserted that the question
of whether the SAR Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa was a Beijing appointee for the
re-election had been asked so many times for good reasons. If it were so, it would
reflect on "how strictly" the Chinese government would adhere to the pledge ("We wiiJ
ask", 2000). In addition, the paper demanded a clear explanation from Jiang of his
equivocal statement "supporting Tung's second tenn but not issuing any imperial
decree".

Lo (1998) suggests that Ming Pao's editorials "appear to tilt toward Beijing".
However, the above two do not seem compatible with his observation.
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South China Morning Post
Many believe that the South China Morning Post has adopted a policy of selfcensorship or censorship in its coverage due to its proprietor's business connections.
Indeed, the daily seldom explicitly criticises Chinese leaders even in its editorials.
However, its support for press freedom has been subtly presented.

Unlike Apple Daily and Ming Pao, the SCMP did not show any strong
opposition to Wang Fengchao's remarks. Rather, it conservatively commented that his
remarks had "everything to do with press freedom", and would be an obstacle for Hong
Kong to create a knowledge-based economy ("Dangerous policy", 2000). The paper
also suggested that it is important to protect press freedom if Hong Kong "is ever to
become a world class city along the lines of New York and London" ("Dangerous
policy", 2000).

Furthermore, the Post emphasised that accurate reporting and

advocating are fundamentally different. In so doing, the daily identified itself as a
responsible medium, where it has presented information from both sides in order for
readers to make an informed decision.

Similarly, the SCMP seemed to keep a relatively neutral stance on the President
Jiang issue. It attributed Jiang's unprecedented outbreak to his Jack of acclimatisation
to the SAR's inquisitive media, who are vastly different from their deferential
counterparts in the mainland ("Press and president", 2000).

Meanwhile, the daily

defended the professionalism of Hong Kong journalists, saying that the simple
questions asked were not necessarily wrong. It pointed out that due to their highly
restricted access to Chinese leaders, it is normal for the SAR reporters to pose as many
questions as they can when the opportunity arises. The Post concluded the editorial
with the statement: "The more remote the leadership, the more frantic the scramble from
the media to know their minds" ("Press and president", 2000).

While the Post's editorials seem fairly tame as compared to Apple Daily's, they
reflect the paper's concern over the situation of press freedom in Hong Kong, as well as
its values of justice in an implicit way.
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Conclusion
In contrast to Chapter One, this chapter has presented a more optimistic view of
press freedom in Hong Kong.
infringements from

Chin~

Firstly, the territory's significant resistance to serious

in the year 2000 was shown. The persistence of some of the

prominent free press advocates certainly played a major part in the fight, but the efforts
of the occasional participants and support from the international community should not
be neglected.

Secondly, the South China Morning Post and Ming Pao were shown no less
tolerant than the pro-democracy Apple Daily when it came to the verbal attacks from
Beijing.

Despite their see1ningly toned-down China cove;·age, the former two dailies

did comment critically on both Wang Fengchao's remarks and President Jiang's
'lecturo'. in their editorials. The words they employed reflected ('clearly' in Ming Pao's
case and 'subtly' in the SCMP's case) their strong support for press freedom.

On the whole, the ensuing 'tug-of-war' in the first four years after the handover
seemed to be in Beijing's favour in the light of the removal of Willy Lam and his
subsequent departure. Negative consequences might result if Beijing became the final
winner ofthe battle, and this will be discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Importance of Preserving Press Freedom in Hong Kong:
A Social, Political and Economic Perspective
As can be seen in Chapter One and Chapter Two, Beijing's interference in the
SAR media can sometimes be quite heavy-handed, and anyone who champions press
freedom (or democracy in general) is basically consioered a subversive. Some may
wonder why stalwarts like Martin Lee and Emily Lau still soldier on so confidently and
intrepidly. The reason could be as simple as this - Hong Kong cannot afford to lose its
freedom ofthe press.

This chapter examines the importance of preserving press freedom in Hong
Kong from three perspectives: social, political and economic. It will explore the topic
by working on the hypothetical assumption that press freedom was taken away from the
SAR. It will predict the negative impacts that might result, and supportive arguments
for these hypotheses will be based on the study of cultural, social and political history of
the territory.

In addition, it will discuss the significance of a /aissez-faire media

environment to maintaining Hong Kong's economic success.

In microcosm: Press freedom and the Hong Kong journalistic circle
The loss of press freedom in Hong Kong will certain! y have the most direct
impacts on the local newsroom, and hence the journalism profession. Studies by Chan,
Lee and Lee (1996, p.33) on Hong Kong journalists during the transition period of the
handover revealed that half of the respondents held a bleak view of the future of press
freedom under Chinese rule. Many of them doubted the feasibility of the 'one country,
two systems' scheme, and expressed uncertainty over their career prospects.

The

emergence of self-censorship and censorship, which has resulted from Beijing's
interference in the media, has already caused some of the top local journalists to quit
their jobs. Willy Lann Wo Lap's resignation from the South China Morning Post is a
more recent and well-publicised example. Another two highly respected editors Daisy

Li Yuet Wah and Carol Lai Pui Yee left their jobs at Ming Pao even before the
handover, as they noticed the link between ·editorial changes and press owners' business
interests on the mainland (Neumann, 1997). Thus, it can be assumed •hat a complete
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curtailment of press freedom would frustrate the apprehensive journalists and further
shake their confidence in staying with the local press.

Willy Lam, Daisy Li and Carol Lai can be regarded as journalists with ideals,

who quit their jobs but remain active in the journalistic circle. However, there are
additional factors that have been encouraging local reporters to leave the profession, the
most major being that journalism has never been well. paying in the territory. The Hong
Kong Journalists Association (HKJA) noticed this problem over ten years ago, pointing

out that the average minimum wage for a reporter at a Chinese newspaper was just
slightly higher than that of a Filipino maid (Mosher, 1988, p.29). Moreover, there exists

a different pay scale in certain bilingual news agencies, where Chinese-language
reporters are paid less than their English-language counterparts (Mosher, p.29). Chan,
Lee and Lee (1996, p.70) draw a more contrasting comparison, saying that the salary of

university graduates working for news media is usually one-third less than their fellow
graduates in other professions that require equally high qualifications. These factors

explain why many young people see journalism as a stepping-stone, where they can
gain experience before hunting for more lucrative jobs in other fields such as public
relations (Chan, et a!., p.43). Switching from one field to another is no problem for

them, since most of the new reporters are degree holders, with good command of both
Chinese and English (Chan, et a!., p.29).

What also plays a part in accounting for the brain drain phenomenon in the Hong

Kong journalistic circle is emigration. Since Hong Kong's reversion to China was made
certain in 1980s, many locals have started emigrating to secure their future after 1997.
The outflow rate peaked after June 4, 1989, when thousands of mainland Chinese

demonstrators who had been ca11ing for democratic reforms at the Tiananmen Square in
Beijing for days, were eventually cracked down upon and killed by China's military
forces. The journalism profession has been affected, with a number of reporters either
having applied or desiring to apply for emigration (Chan, et a!., p.37). Some American

congressmen expressed concern over press freedom in the territory, and "tried to
introduce a bill to protect the Hong Kong journalists by allowing them to emigrate to
the United States" (Lo, 1998). The 'assistance' from America would simply aggravate
the brain drain.
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Those who have no intention of leaving would also need to worry about whether
they would remain employed for long. Thus, they may choose to adopt self-censorship
in order to survive. That being said, the possibility of doing a good job with the absence

of freedom and independence is imaginably low. The unsatisfactory working conditions
(low pay and lack of autonomy) would also discourage fresh graduates from considering
journalism as a career option. Journalistic standards would drop if under-qualified
people who have no relevant background knowledge had to be relied upon as reporters.
With a lack of talent in the profession foliowed by a decline in quality, Hong Kong's

vibrant press scene would severely shrink.
It is important to point out that not all journalists who stayed behind are willing

to compromise. A survey by Chan, Lee and Lee (1996, p.117) has revealed that an
overwhelming percentage of the respondents agreed that "the media should fight to

maximize Hong Kong's autonomy'', under which press freedom could flourish. There
is likely to be social and political disorder if China decided to infringe on the SAR's
freedom of the press and other individual rights. This will be discussed at length in the

next section.

In macrocosm: Press freedom and the SAR citizens
To predict how the whole community would be affected by the disappearance of

press freedom, it is necessary to mention the Basic. Law, the mini-constitution of the
SAR in which press freedom is enshrined. Chapter Three, Article 27 of the Basic Law
states that "Hong Kong residents shall have freedom of speech, of the press and of
publication" (Committee on the Promotion of Civic Education, 1999, p.l 08). Article 39
further assures these freedoms by promising to comply with the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (p.l 09). Taking the fact that press freedom is recognised
as a fundamental civil right for local residents, the curtailment of this particular freedom

would mean that China is in the position to reduce other rights currently enshrined in
the Basic Law, such as the freedom of association, the right to strike and fonn unions.
This would outrage a majority of the SAR citizens due to their political attitudes, beliefs
and way oflife.
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Hong Kong people are nowadays generally considered as "outspoken" and
"being able to react promptly and cleverly" (Ma & Fung, 1999, p.507). This is vastly
different from the impression of them prior to late 1980s, when they were observed
apathetic and inactive towards politics (McMillen, 1993, p.3).

This view was

demolished after the occurrence of the Tiananmen Square massacre, which brought
about profound effects on the territory both socially and politically. On one hand,
Hongkongers' confidence in China's ability to keep its words was badly shaken. Those
who were terrified of what might come next chose to emigrate, of which the majority
was middle-class professionals. On the other hand, it began their political awakening
and unity, with a million of them took to the streets and called for speedier
democratisation in both China and Hong Kong (McMillen, p.5). It also sparked off the

formation of various formal political parties, with the United Democrats of Hong Kong
(the UDHK, now the Democratic Party) being the pioneer.

The Hong Kong people's political inclinations have been made clear during the
direct elections to the Legislative Council in 1991 and 1995, where the Democratic
Party and its former body the UDHK won an overwhelming number of seats (Lee, 1996,
p.241). Their support for democratisation was also reflected in the "unusually high
popularity" enjoyed by Hong Kong's last governor Christopher Patten (Blyth &
Wotherspoon, 1996, p.277), who introduced a reform package to accelerate the

development of democracy in the territory and therefore became a thorn in Chi11a's side.
In addition, Hongkongers started to express their concerns over their interests in a more

explicit and vocal way. Public protests and demonstrations have become common
occurrences in the territory since the June 4 (Tiananmen) events. As pro-democracy
legislator Mart.in Lee (Lee, 1996, p.243) points out, those who chose to stay in the
territory are likely to have developed the "people in the same boat" mentality, whereby

even ordinary citizens would be willing to "do a little bit more to preserve their own
liberties". In particular, local citizens expect the Hong Kong government to be "tolerant
of different and opposing views" (Lo, 1998) as an effect of the Tiananmen Square
incident. Evidence can be cited in the outrage triggered by a Chinese diplomat in

France who warned a Hong Kong journalist not pose any sensitive questions to visiting
Chinese premier Zhu Rongji in April 1998 (U.S. Department of State, 1999). A more
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recent example is the outrage resulting from Chinese official Wang Fengchao's warning
to the SAR media regarding Taiwan reports in April2001.

If verbal attacks could cause community-wide protests, it is imaginable that
social and political upheavals would result if the CCP was to take direct actions against
the SAR. McMillen (1993, p.9) observes that Hong Kong people have developed "a
sense of bitterness and betrayal as well as a loss of trust" in the Chinese authorities.

Surveys have also revealed that they "are prepared to defend social stability almost at
any cost" (Chan & Lee, 1999, p.72). Furthermore, Hongkongers can be people of
extremes in the sense that they would go to great lengths to put a point across. For
example, in March 2001, a local citizen set himself on fire in front of the Supreme Court
as a way of protesting against a proposed government regulation.

This case was

followed by another person who seriously injured himself at the headquarters of the
Social Welfare Department, because he thought he did not get enough welfare benefits
from the government. Although these cases only relate to two individuals out of the
population of seven million, a huge uproar will most definitely result when it comes to a

tangible threat that affects everyone.

The worst and the most extreme scenario would be that of the Hong Kong
people emulating Taiwan by breaking away from the mainland, perhaps even declaring
independence. This would put the territory in jeopardy because history has shown that
China values national stability above all (Ting, 1993, p.258), as can be seen in the June
4 events. Hongkongers' calls for greater social and political freedoms in both the
mainland and the territory were already seen as attempts to subvert the Chinese

government (Ting, p.265). If Hong Kong were to commit acts detrimental to China's
national stability or even its position of power, the Chinese government would most

likely declare a state of martial law in the territory and deploy troops to quell civil
unrest. It is noteworthy that the People's Liberation Army (the PLA, China's armed
forces) has been statiomd in the territory for the purpose of "defence" since the
handover (Committee on the Promotion of Civic Education, 1999, p.IOS). While the
PLA will not intervene in the territory's internal affairs according to the Basic Law,

Beijing could easily violate the law in the name of securing national stability and unity.
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Since the SAR does not have its own military forces like Taiwan does, it might result in
a situation worse than that of the Tiananmen Square incident.

Significance of press freedom to Hong Kong as a major financial marketplace
Hong Kong economist Y. C. Yao believes that the Hong Kong financial markets
have thrived under the stable political climate as well as the legal system that Britain
provided (Wang, 1994, p.l93).

Combining this fact and the assumption that

Hongkongers would create a major uproar if press freedom and other civil liberties were
taken away, it is imaginable that the territory's economy would no doubt be seriously
affected. Massive protests or worse would mean that the stable political climate that the
city has enjoyed will be adversely affected; the disappearance of freedoms and rights
guaranteed in the Basic Law would also imply that the constitution is being violated.

Hong Kong's current economic system, which is a capitalist system adopted
under British rule, is also enshrined in the Basic Law. Chapter I, Article 5 states that
the SAR's previous social and economic systems will remain unchanged for 50 years
after the handover (Committee on the Promotion of Civic Education, 1999, p.l03). The
free market economy, together with a strategic location and ease of tnmsport, has made
Hong Kong an ideal place for many international corporations to run their Asian
operations (Wang, 1994, p.l93). However, what plays a more vital role is freedom of
the press.

According to Neumarm (1997), there exists an "inextricable relationship

between the free flow of information and the strength of financial markets". This means
that rapid exchange of accurate and uncensored economic information is necessary for
the smooth functioning of the regional economy. The Hong Kong government's handsoff attitude towards the press makes this possible, hence a climate of free expression is
created. Foreign investors have come to rely on the continual supply of information by
the local press, in order to understand the financial changes that are undetway in the
region (Neumann, 1997).

In addition to trust and confidence from foreign investors, the free flow of
information and the free market economy has also earned Hong Kong memberships in a
variety of international and regional organisations, such as the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation forum (APEC), the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) and
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its successor, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Yahuda, 1997, p.209).

If the

Chinese government were to violate the Basic Law and impose its socialist policies on
the SAR, official corruption that is pervasive in the mainland might start to proliferate
in the territory with disastrous effects. As YahuC:a (1997, p.211) predicts, international

corporations will have to reassess the value of Hong Kong if it is infected by corrupt
practices. This might result in a scaling down of these companies' presence in the
territory or even total departure. Considering the fact that an unfavourable human rights
record had given China a hard time in gaining entry to the WTO, it would also be
difficult for Hong Kong to regain its status if damage v.as done to its international

image as well as confidence.

Press freedom and the implications of China's economic liberalisation on Hong
Kong's economy

There is another way to examine the implications of China's WTO accession on
the relationship between Hong Kong's press freedom and its economy. Hong Kong and
China have long been each other's largest trading partner. The territory is often seen as
the mainland's gateway to and from the rest of the world, for it serves as the main
channel for China's imports, exports and re-exports (Hong Kong Trade Department
Council, 2001).

China also has substantial business interests in Hong Kong, with

diversified investment like banking and property development (Hong Kong Economic

& Trade Office (Canada), 2001).

However, this cosy and reciprocal economic relationship may undergo changes
that would be to Hong Kong's disadvantage.

Bowring (1997, p.22) suggests that

international companies based in Hong Kong that have business and investments in
China now "feel the need to expand their presence in the mainland". Moreover, China's
main commercial city Shanghai has been enhancing its attractiveness by improving its
infrastructure and transportation, as well as the living and working conditions for
foreign expatriates (Bowring, 1997, p.22). Besides, the WTO membership will speed

up economic restructuring, promoting China's direct foreign investments as well as
imports and exports (Global Resources, 2001).

As a result, the significance of the

territory's role of functioning as the intermediary for capital flows into China will be

largely reduced. Therefore, a free press that provides accurate economic information, in
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addition to a well-established legal system that discourages corruption and protects
press freedom and other individual rights seems to be the only safeguard to sustain the

competitive edge of Hong Kong's economy.

Significance of press freedom to Hong Kong as a regional media centre
The Joss of press freedom would not only endanger Hong Kong's status as a

major financial marketplace, but also its status as a regional media centre. By virtue of
the reasons mentioned above, the territory has attracted a vast network of both regional
and international news organisations for many years. An additional factor is that
journalists are not required to have licenses or special visas in order to operate in Hong
Kong like they do in many other countries in Asia (Neumann, 1997). The city is

currently a South East Asian base for many international newsgathering agencies like
Associated Press; it is also a base for regional and international publications such as the
Far Eastern Economic Review and the Asian Wall Street Journal (Infonnation Services
Department, 2002).

Singapore has long been a major competitor of Hong Kong for being a regional
communications hub in East Asia. With equally modem infrastructure and advanced

communication technologies, a free press is a crucial element that gives the territory an
advantage over Singapore and makes the foreign newsgathering agencies stay (Bowring,
1997, p.23). However, with Hong Kong's reversion to China and a potential restriction

on press freedom, bureau chiefs of these organisations have been looking at alternative
locations (Wrout, 1997, p.164). Being aware of these concerno, Singapore's Senior
Minister Lee Kuan Yew had been in Hong Kong promoting his country as an alternative
regional media hub (Wrout, 1997, 164). Lee has pointerl out in an interview that <he

SAR is less "organised" than Singapore, and is less flexible due to its currency link with
the U.S. dollar ("Singapore's Lee", 1999). In fact, the substantially lower rental costs

also rilake Singapore more attractive than the SAR once the issue of press freedom is
put aside. If the SAR were to lose its comparative advantage, these organisations would
move without hesitation. It is noteworthy that international news agency Reuters, which
was once based in Hong Kong, has already relocated to Singapore.
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The Hong Kong press as a reliable source on China news for overseas Chinese

Aside from attracting regional and foreign new agencies, press freedom helps
the Hong Kong press win the hearts of both local and overseas Chinese readers. The
wide range of political opinions available in the vibrant local press enables Hong Kong
to enjoy profits from both the domestic and international markets. Many locals are
observed to have a strong need for information, approximately 797,000 of them reading
at least two newspapers a day (Mcintyre, 1998, p.36). However, as Chan (1997, p.231)

points out, Hong Kong's domestic market is too small to sustain an economy of scale
with the population of about seven million. Its smallness is actually compensated by an

international market, where media products made in Hong Kong are consumed by
readers from the Chinese diaspora in many countries. In particular, the Hong Kong
press has become an important channel in spreading news on China around the world.

In contrast to the strict control of the mainland media by the Beijing govemmcat, the
Iocallaissez-faire media environment with virtually no restrictions allows credible and

accurate infonnation to be published without being heavily censored.
Apart from the free flow of information, the territory's geographical proximity
to China enables fast and easy assess to information about the mainland (Chan & To,
1999, p.486). Furthermore, the Hong Kong journalists have an advantage over their

Western and Asian counterparts by virtue of their "extensive Chinese connections", as
well as "good knowledge in the Chinese language and culture" (Chan & To, p.486). All
of these factors explain why the local Chinese-language press has served as a trusted

source on China news for overseas Chinese.

If press freedom were restrained, Hong

Kong would no longer be a "safe haven" for professional and independent Chineselanguage reporting on Chinese affairs (Neumann, 1997). Hence, Chinese from all over
the world would only get to read what the mainland wants the world to know about
China.

Conclusion

Given the unsatisfactory conditions and uncertain future of the Hong Kong

journalistic circle, press freedom is an important instrument to soothe the local
reporters' anxiety towards their career prospects. It helps maintain the SAR's vibrant
press scene by preventing a drop in journalistic standards caused by the loss of good
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reporters. Looking at a larger scale, the respect and preservation of press freedom and
other civil rights would help stem the brain drain phenomenon and regain Hongkongers'
confidence in both the Chinese and the SAR's authorities. It would also aid preserving
social and political stability in the SAR.

From the economic point of view, freedom of the press is necessary to attract
foreign business corporations and news agencies to operate in Hong Kong, especially
when the territory is facing constant and increasing competition from Singapore and
China respectively. With the lack of a climate of freedom in these two countries, the
SAR press' ability of providing accurate and uncensored economic infonnation is a
safeguard to sustain the territory's robust economy.

Simply understanding the importance of keeping press freedom in Hong Kong
would not be effective enough to put an end to the 'tug-of-war'. Chapter Four will

show how China and the SAR can reach a compromise on press freedom by discussing
what they need to understand about each other.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Agree to Disagree:
How Hong Kong and China Can Reach a Compromise
on Press Freedom
The discussion in Chapter Three has created the impression that China is in the
wrong in trying to curb Hong Kong's press freedom, which is essential for the SAR's
survival. However, Hong Kong is no innocent victim either and is also responsible for
the ongoing 'tug-of-war' due to its insufficient understanding of China.

This chapter stresses that in order for China and Hong Kong to reach a
compromise on press freedom, it is necessary ,.. ·r the two to develop a better
understanding of each other as well as themselves. It will elaborate on the fundamental
political beliefs and ideologies adopted by China and the SAR. It will also discuss their
different interpretations of important tenns as well as their respective media's
perception of social responsibility. In addition, the recent development of liberalisation
in China will be mentioned, in order for Hong Kong to rethink its negative impression
of its motherland.

What Hong Kong needs to understand: Reasons for China's rejection of western
liberal concepts
While Hong Kong and the West are not wrong in sharing their message of
freedom and democracy with China and other authoritarian regimes, it is necessary to
understand that western values such as respect for human rights and the free market
economy are not universal and applicable to every country. Chapter Three has pointed
out that political stability, the legal system and the climate of freedom provided by
Britain were key elements that made Hong Kong a major regional financial and media
centre, as well as a trusted source on China news. Thus, the territory appears to be a
good example to support the western idea that economic progress is dependent on
democracy (Human Rights Internet, 2000). However, the breakdown ofthe Soviet bloc
had shown that this formula for success is open to debate. Former Soviet Union leader
Gorbachev adopted the policies of glanost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) for
domestic reform (Ting, 1993, p.250). His liberation of civil society and nationalism
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created the impetus that not only caused an economic decline, but also the disintegration
of the Soviet Union itself(Ting, p.251).

However, being an authoritarian regime as well, China's economic status tells a
different story. China's economic growth has been consistently dominating Asia for a
number of years, whereas other places in the region have been affected by the 1997

Asian financial crisis and the recent global economic slowdown (Asia Pacific
Management Forum, 2002). Being aware of its own economic success and the failure
of the Soviet Union, it is no surprise that China holds sceptical views towards the "new
international climate", where formerly authoritarian countries like South Africa and
Nepal started to followed the 'three-D's' - democratisation, de-ideologisation and
development (Ting, 1993, p.251). While retaining its favouritism towards socialism and

its scepticism towards western capitalism, China's position on the conflict between the
two polar systems is rather neutral. It believes that "mutual interaction and absorption
can promote progress in human civilisation", but no country should impose their social
systems and ways oflife on others (Ting, p.252).

What Hong Kong and the West have been urging China to adopt is not only the

capitalist economic system, but also the western definition of the term 'human rights'.
As part of the western ideal of democracy, human rights are regarded as a set of natural
rights that is higher than any statute law (Morikawa, n.d.). However, many seem to
overlook the fact that China is not a democracy. As indicated by its name, the People's
Republic of China is fundamentally a republic. A republic is defined as a state in which

"all segments of society are enfranchised and in which a state's power is
constitutionally limited" (Encyclopedia.com, 2002). In other words, both the citizens
and their elected representatives are subject to law. Thus, instead of 'human rights',
China describes the rights enjoyed by its people as "citizen's rights", which are subject
to the law provided by the constitution (Morikawa, n.d.).

Chinese President Jiang

Zemin has also made clear that "there is no absolute freedom above the law" (Fong,
1996). This explains why there is seemingly no freedom in China although there are
various kinds of freedom guaranteed in the Constitution of the People's Republic of

Cilina (1994), such as freedom of speech, of the press, of demonstration and of religious
belief (p.29-30).
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Aside from economic reasons and the political nature of China, there is another
factor which accounts for the mainland's refusal to heed the calls for speedier

democratisation and adoption of western concepts. George (2000, p.52), a commentator
on Singaporean politics, points out that the reason why Singapore refuses to adopt the
Westem liberal ideologies is because there exists a "shameful memory of white
imperialism, military intervention and economic exploitation" in its people's minds.
Unlike Singapore, which was formerly a colony of Britain, China was not colonised by

any one nation. However, its numerous defeats at the hands of western powers in the
1840s rendered it a virtually landlocked country when the foreign victors demanded
treaty ports. The return of Hong Kong from the British and that of Macau from the

Portuguese marked the end of colonialism in China, and more importantly, the
restoration of Chinese national pride. Thus, if Singaporeans hold a "deep suspicion and
sensitivity towards the slightest hint of post-colonial condescension" (George, p.52), it
can be assumed that the mainland Chinese share the same mentality. Indeed, China

explicitly expresses its antipathy against colonialism in the preamble of its constitution
by stating that it consistently "supports the oppressed nations and the developing

countries in their just struggle to win and preserve national independence" (Constitution
of the People's Republic of China, 1994, p.6).

What China needs to understand: 'Pro-democracy' differs from 'anti-China'

The Hong Kong people do not seem to show the marked resistance and

disgruntlement towards colonialism and western liberalism, unlike those in China and
Singapore do. It is partly due to the territory's economic success, political stability as
well as modernisation under British rule. A study has revealed that Hong Kong's living
standards, economic development and the political system are what many locals base
their claims of Hong Kong identity on (Thomas, 1999, p.87).

Nevertheless, it is

important to make clear that being western-minded and pro-democracy does not
translate into anti-China feelings. This can be explained by the formation of 'Hong
Kong identity'.

Instead of being anti-China, it is more appropriate to say that Hong Kong is
inherently opposed to communism. By the late 1940s, the people of Hong Kong were
largely made up of refugees from China, who were escaping from the communist
regime's rigid socio-political doctrine (Thomas, 1999, p.79). Local democrat Martin
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Lee, whose father came as a refugee, points out that freedom wa"l what brought this first
generation to the territory (Callick, 1998, p.141). With their cultural roots linked to the
mainland and the absorption of western values from the eo Ionia! rule, they developed a
distinctive Hong Kong way of life over time (Ma & Fung, 1999, p.499).

For the

subsequent generations who were locally born in the territory, and made up over
seventy percent of the population by the 1990s, Hong Kong is the only place they
identify themselves with (Thomas, p.83). Although being committed to Chinese culture,

everyday experiences and a process of social and political changes have further tied
these generations to the territory as well its local culture (Thomas, p.83). Hence, they

have become more concerned with local public affairs and more assertive about their
rights and interests (Chan & Lee, 1999, p.69).

Having been ruled by the British for over 150 years, Hongkongers' interests are
inevitably western-influenced. They tend to see the liberal concepts imported from
Britain such as individual rights and freedoms as fundamental values. While many
locals are proud of the Hong Kong identity, the Chinese authorities have perceived it as
"a token of colonial power and a historical insult" (Ma & Fung, 1999, p.499). They

seem to translate the Hongkongers' pro-democracy spirit into an anti-nationalistic
sentiment. Despite China's implicit disapproval of the territory's social and political
systems, which are vastly different from those of China, the two places had worked on

the principle of 'well water does not mix with river water' - a Chinese idiom meaning
not to interfere in each other's affairs (McMillen, 1993, p.20). Hong Kong was seen by

China as having broken this unwritten rule, when a large number of its citizens took to
the streets, protesting against the Chinese government's crackdown on the prodemocracy movement at Tiananmen Square in Beijing in 1989.
In terms of the 'well water' principle, the Hongkongers'

calls for

democratisation and greater freedoms in China after the Tiananmen crackdown could be
considered as interference with China's internal affairs. However, they did so due to
several reasons, but had no intention of overthrowing the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP). According to Thomas (1999, p.207), anger erupted over China's brutal actions
because the people in the territory sympathised the demonstrators, who "based their
ideological position in the liberal-democratic school of thought" like they did. More
importantly, it held significant implications for Hong Kong's future after the handover.
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Due to the fact that rights and freedoms have become part of the Hong Kong way of life,

the local citizens have expressed their desire for democracy and have protested against
China's intervention in the territory more frequently and in a more explicit way since
the Tiananmen incident. This turns into a misunderstanding when the Chinese leaders
interpret all these demonstrations as acts of anti-nationalism. They view the territory as
a base for subversive activities, and in particular frown on the vocal Democratic Party.
As a matter of fact, the Democratic Party as well as the westemised and prodemocracy Hong Kong people have never styled themselves as an alternate government
(Thomas, 1999, p.210). Ma & Fung's (1999, p.519) survey on Hongkongers' attitudes
towards the handover has revealed that 75 percent of the respondents generally agreed
that Hong Kong is part of China, and therefore were very positive about the
reunification with socialist China. Unlike the Chinese government, they do not see the
return of sovereignty and safeguarding the autonomy of the territory as opposites to
each other (Ma & Fung, p.517). While Hongkongers admit that they might not be as
patriotic as their mainland comrades (Ma & Fung, p.508), they certainly are not antiChina. The fact that they have been trying to share the message of democracy with
China suggests that they want China to be just as modernised and sophisticated as the
territory. They nm on the assumption that what is good for Hong Kong would be good
for the mainland (although this has been proved arguable earlier in this chapter).

What Hong Kong and China need to understand: Different interpretations of
terms and concepts

The problem of Hongkongers' 'assertion' being viewed as 'subversion' by
mainland Chinese leaders can be attributed to their different interpretations of the terms

'patriotism' and 'nationalism'.

To China, patnotism and nationalism require

"unconditional support for the actions of the Chinese govenunent", whereas
Hongkongers feel that "allegiance to their country needs not to extend to approval of its
government" (DeGolyer, 1993, p.274). This reflects that people of Hong Kong perceive

the term 'democracy' in its purest fonn, where everyone in a society has a right to
participate in making every decision regarding state policies (Xrefer.com, 2002). One

the other hand, China takes 'democracy' to mean that sovereign power resides in and is
exercised by the proletariat class directly or indirectly through a system of
representation (Morikawa, n.d.). To borrow Morikawa's (n.d.) term, there is "internal
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democracy" for all except those who are opposed to the CCP government. By virtue of

such definitions, China tends to see those who protest against state po1icies as
opponents, or even subversives.

Apart from being pro-democracy (in their own definition), what has made

Hongkongers assertive and persistent about their rights and freedoms is that they have
been granted a 'high degree of autonomy' by China. This is guaranteed in both the
Sino-British Joint Declaration (an agreement signed by China and Britain in 1984) and
the Basic Law, Hong Kong's mini-constitution in the post-1997 era. A 'high degree of

autonomy' contains the concept of 'self-rule', which is another term open for
misinterpretation. On one hand, 'self-rule' means "full independence", which is the
way Hongkongers perceive the term (Harris, 1988, p.234). A survey by Ma and Fung
(1999, p.519) has reaffirmed Harris' assertion, where 68 percent of the respondents

agreed that the SAR should be free of the central govenunent's interference, and over
80 percent assented to the item "mainlanders should not attempt to use their standards to
change Hong Kong people". Nevertheless, to China, 'self-rule' is a "mere euphemism
for something more akin to subordinate status" (Harris, 1988, p.234). Harris (p.234)

further explains that China's definition of 'self-rule' originates from the ancient Chinese
empire, which was "well aware of the role of tributary states within an overall
suzerainty''. It would seem that Hanis' assessment of China's view on 'self-rule' is
applicable to the years following the handover, taking into account the interferences in
Hong Kong's affairs by the Chinese government despite the promise of a 'high degree

of autonomy'.

The problem with a 'high degree of autonomy' seems to echo Hong Kong's last

governor Christopher Patten's remarks on the Sino-British Joint Declaration - "the
mystery begins when Chinese officials start to say what they think that means" (Patten,
1996, p.281). Expressing a similar concern, Foster (1997) asserts that 'freedom of the

press', which is also enshrined in the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, is simply an
"illusory promise". He points out that in the original Chinese-language text of China's

constitution, the term 'freedom of the press' only refers to the acknowledgement that
freedom is granted to the act of publishing (chuban), but does not extend to freedom of

seeking and obtaining information. In addition, the government's authority to constrain
or annul its promises is 'protected' by Article 51 of China's constitution, which
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prohibits the citizens from any infringement upon societal or state interests when
exercising their guaranteed rights and freedoms (Constitution of the People's Republic
of China, 1994, p.36). These explain why the editorial independence of the mainland
media is tightly controlled and interfered with by the Chinese government, even though

there exists the promise of'freedom of the press'. Chinese President Jiang Zemin has
also specifically stressed that "there is no press in the world that is not subject to laws"
(Fong, 1996).

Applying such a definition to Hong Kong, China has extended its pressures to
the territory's press as well (as discussed in Chapter One). However, the Basic Law
gives China no reasonable ground to do so. Article 27 of the English version of the
Basic Law states that Hong Kong residents shall enjoy freedom of the press and of
publication (Committee on the Promotion of Civic Education, 1999, p.l08). In the

Chinese version, 'the press' is translated as "xinwen", meaning news infonnation; and
'publication' is translated as "chuban", referring to the act of publishing (Committee on
the Promotion of Civic Education, p. 79). The clear separation of the terms 'the press'
(or 'xinwen') and 'publication' (or 'chuban') implies that they hold different meanings
and that they are not interchangeable in either the English or Chinese version. Thus, the
SAR media are allowed to report and publish any news items freely in accordance to the

Basic Law.

What China needs to understand: The Hong Kong media's perception of social
responsibility
The different interpretations of the term 'freedom of the press' result in two

different modes of press operation as well as differing perceptions of 'social
responsibility' between Hong Kong and China. President Jiang gave a speech on how
the media in Hong Kong and Macau should operate. He advised them to heed their

'social responsibility', which is to aid the mainland in promoting values such as loyalty
to the nation as well as working towards economic and social stability (Wong, 2000b).
In response to Jiang's speech, the pro-democracy paper Apple Daily ran an editorial

elaborating on the SAR's own perception of 'social responsibility'. The paper asserted
that it is part of the media's obligation to provide the public with different voices,
including "the most radical, reactionary and anachronistic" (Lo, 2000e). It is because
this is the only way in which readers can make informed opinions and judgements by
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sifting through a host of differing opinions. Apple Daily further commented that the
Hong Kong media would tum out to be irresponsible only when they were given a

"political mission"- to suppress opinions and reports which are 'politically incorrect' in
the eyes ofthe CCP (Lo, 2000e).

Remarkably, newspapers with different political orientations from Apple Daily
also hold the same belief. For instance, the South China Morning Post (SCMP or the

Post) made a similar comment in its editorial on Chinese official Wang Fengchao's
warnings to the SAR media on Taiwan reports. It emphasized that accurate reporting is
necessary for readers to make intelligent decisions ("Dangerous policy", 2000).
Surveys on Hong Kong journalists by Chan, Lee and Lee (1996, p.87) have also shown
that an overwhelming majority of their respondents regard "objective reporting" and the

role of "neutral disseminator" as important.
In addition, local media outlets, regardless of their political inc1inations,

generally believe that it is their social responsibility to serve as a watchdog of
government and dignitaries (Chan, Lee & Lee, 1996, p.90). This belief is a mirror of
the concept of the 'Fourth Estate', whereby the news media act as the fourth branch of
the government (the other three being executive, legislative, and judiciary), keeping the
government in check so that it does not abuse its power. According to Schultz (1998,
p.6), the Fourth Estate should always be "watching, questioning, analysing and

infonning" in order to ensure that the govenunent will enforce the current rule of law.
Indeed, renowned for their outspokenness and investigative spirit, the Hong Kong
media accept a "participant-interpretive" role, where they will speak for the people as
well as analyse and interpret complex issues (Chan, et al., p.87).

With the increasingly close ties between media proprietors and Beijing (as

discussed in Chapter One) and the growing sensationalism found in certain newspapers,
the idea of the local press being the Fourth Estate can be questioned; however, there
have been cases showing that the press does fulfil this role from much of the time as far
as Hong Kong is concerned. In July 2000, Robert Chung of the University of Hong
Kong alleged in the SCMP that Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa had attempted to gag
his opinion polls on Tung's popularity via a "special channel" (Hong Kong Journalists
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Apparently, Tung's senior special

assistant Andrew Lo raised doubts on Chung's polls during a meeting with the
university's vice-chancellor Cheng Yiu Chung. Cheng and Professor Wong Siu Lun
were later found guilty by an inquiry panel for trying to put a stop to Robert Chung's
polls and inhibiting his right to academic freedom. They resigned from the university
under public pressure (HKJA & Article 19, p.l6). Another recent example is a scandal
involving former legislative councillor Gary Cheng Kai Nam. Apple Daily revealed that
Gary Cheng had failed to declare a consultancy company that he had set up for more

than two years, and had leaked confidential government documents to a business
contact (Cheung, 2000). He bowed to the pressure formed by the media and the public,
and relinquished all his public and political positions. At the end of2001, Gary Cheng
was convicted and sentenced to prison on four counts (Or & Choi, 2001).

As can be seen, Hong Kong reporters favour and adopt western journalistic
practises and liberal ideologies. This is partly due to the fact that Hong Kong's laissez-

fa ire media is a legacy of British rule. According to Lo (1998), the colonial state
allowed the pluralistic existence of leftist (pro-China), rightist (pro-Taiwan) and centrist

press because they could "check and balance the influence among themselves". As a
result, an image of protecting freedom of the speech and of the press was created. The
traces of western influence can also be attributed to the style of education Hong Kong

journalists receive. Journalism education in the territory adopts an American style of
curriculum and teaching materials, due to the fact that a significant number of teaching

staff getting their degrees in communication from major universities in the United States
(Chan, Lee & Lee, 1996, p.59). Moreover, many young people who cannot get through

the narrow entrances of the local universities opt to further their studies in Taiwan, in
which journalism education is equally American-influenced (Chan, et al., p.55).

Being western-influenced does not mean that the SAR media are anti-China, just
as the same theory applies to the territory's citizens in general. In fact, they played a

vital role in "re-sinicisation", a process of nationalisation among Hongkongers during
the run-up to 1997 (Ma & Fung, 1999, p.511). The media "rediscovered" the territory's
cultural, historical and economic ties with the mainland in the wake of the political

transition; they presented icons and images of China, so as to "accelerate a mainland
blending into the Hong Kong cultural mosaic" and help "refigure and reproduce the
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cultural transfonnation" (Ma & Fung, p.512). It suggests that the SAR media are not
troublemakers who only know how to satirise and criticise the Chinese leaders, and

break 'unfavourable' or 'sensitive' news about China.

Rather, they can serve as

intennediaries, promoting mutual understanding between the territory and its
motherland.

In this way, the Hong Kong media are also fulfilling Beijing's

interpretation of 'social responsibility', as they are promoting national unity through
their re-sinicisation efforts.
What Hong Kong needs to understand: China's steps towards liberalisation and
greater tolerance of press freedom
China's strict control over the mainland media, increasing interference in the
Hong Kong press and its continuing suppression of dissent seem to suggest that it will
require some time for the country to reach a compromise on press freedom with the
SAR. However, there are encouraging signs showing that China is willing to step

towards liberalisation, and perhaps greater tolerance towards press freedom. One such
sign is China's entry to the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The granting of China's

WTO membership was mainly due to the country's agreement to "undertake a series of
important commitments to open and liberalise its regime", in which China is required to
revise its existing domestic law and enact new laws that are fully compliant with the
WTO agreement (World Trade Organisation, 2001). As Cao (2000) mentions in Asia

Week, international trade and investment demand "legal transparency, political openness
and clean government". Given China's current business environment where corrupt
practices are rampant and government policies are opaque, the mainland needs to
implement refonns in order to comply with WTO standards.

Cao (2000) further

suggests that a free press will play a vital role in improving the efficiency of China's
fight against corruption, by providing a channel for citizens to expose corrupt practices.
In this case, China will inevitably have to grant the mainland media greater press
freedom not only to the act of publishing but also to freedom of content.

Like its entry to the WTO, China's successful bid for the 2008 Olympic Garnes
will also bring about economic growth as well as liberalisation. The western media
generally believed that Beijing's failure to win the 2000 Olympics bid in 1993 was a
result of its unfavourable 'human rights' record, especially the fresh memory of the

Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 (Towson, 2001). Indeed, there were calls for votes
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against Beijing by the European and American press during the bidding process
(Korporaal, 2001). Thus, China's victory in this recent bid implies that the West has

acknowledged China's improvement in its 'human rights' record, despite the fact that
the International Olympic Committee (lOC) had received e-mails and letters from
human rights groups opposing Beijing's successful bid (Korporaal, 2001).

More

importantly, China has promised a "gradual loosening of restrictions on reporters",
whereby it will ensure "complete freedom" for those who will come to cover the Games
(Gilley, 2001, p.30). From this statement alone, it can be concluded that journalists
from Hong Kong would also be granted the same freedom of reporting as their foreign

counterparts.

Conclusion

When it comes to the adoption of western values, China and Hong Kong hold
different attitudes.

The former is opposed to the idea partly because of its own

econormc success achieved without wholesale adoption of the capitalist system.
Moreover, China insists on the republican principle that everything is subject to law,
including the God-given and unalienable 'human rights' which the West advocates.

China's emphasis on national pride and its antipathy towards colonialism and western
imperialism are other contributory factors. On the other side of the fence, the political
stability and robust economy which flourished under British rule have made
Hongkongers in general western-minded and pro-democracy. Distrust has then been
developed when China mistook the territory's 'pro-democracy' stance as 'anti-China'.

The development of distrust can be attributed to the different ways of how the
two places interpret certain terms, with 'freedom of the press' being one of those. This
leads to different perceptions ofthe media's social responsibility by the SAR media and

by the Chinese government, which can be considered as a main cause for the 'tug-ofwar'. Conflicts arise when one sees the media as institutions to prevent abuses of power,
whereas the other sees them as tools for promoting state policies and enhancing

nationalistic sentiments.
While insisting on its socialist ideals, China is gradually stepping towards
liberalisation, which will speed up political restructuring. Its recent entry to the World
Trade Organisation and its successful bid for the 2008 Olympics provide hope for
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Beijing journalists who wish to be granted greater press freedom, as well as hope for the
disappearance of China's interference in the Hong Kong media.

Conclusion
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CONCLUSION
The tug-of-war over press freedom in Hong Kong had assumed an air of urgency
following Wang Fengchao's remarks, President Jiang's 'lecture' and the removal of
Willy Lam. Press freedom advocates were particularly concerned with the future state
of the SAR's media, as those three incidents occurred within the year 2000. The
interferences from Beijing were thus construed as a stepping up of the central
government's attempts to rein in the /aissezfaire press system of Hong Kong to
confonn to the strict press model in the mainland.

While many critics believe that self-censorship poses a great threat to press
freedom in Hong Kong, some argue that censorship is the main nemesis of the SAR
journalists. There have been studies backed by facts and figures which reveal that selfcensorship has been practiced by a number of journalists. The case study of Lam's
removal from the South China Morning Post is confinnation in this long-running debate,
corroborating that the practice of censorship exists. The rejection of two 'sensitive'
columns by the Past's editors, and the removal of Willy Lam are examples of editorial
censorship and managerial censorship respectively.

Closely related to the 'self-censorship debate' is the controversy over the link
between proprietorial influence and the paper's political direction. Some attribute the
alleged kowtowing stance of the SCMP and Ming Paa to the influence of their
respective owners Robert Kuok Hock Nien and Tiong Hiew King, who both have
'patriotic sentiments' towards China as well as substantial economic interests in the
mainland. Indeed, proprietorial influence seems to be at work in these two papers when
one compares the headlines of their reports on the Wang and Jiang cases, to those of the
pro-democracy paper Apple Daily.

This argument is further underpinned by the

qualitative analysis of how the two cases were covered by these three dailies, with

Apple Daily standing out as the bluntest and most confrontational. It is no surprise, as
its owner Jimmy Lai Chi Ying is a freedom advocate who encourages criticism even on
Chinese leaders.

Conclusion

56

The toning down of the coverage on China and the removal of Willy Lam
suggest that Beijing has built up a lead in the tug-of-war over press freedom in Hong
Kong by the end of the fourth year after the handover. However, by looking on the
other side of the issue, this thesis has pointed out that the center marker of the rope did

not move too far away from the pro-press freedom side. Through presenting certain
prominent figures' verbal comments and public reactions to the Wang, Jiang and Lam
incidents, the SAR's resistance to China's interference in the press has been shown as
significant. These figures, namely Martin Lee, Emily Lau, Anson Chan and the Hong

Kong Journalists Association, were not fighting alone. They had received support from
other groups and individuals in the territory, as well as from the international
community.
A qualitative analysis of Apple Daily, Ming Pao and the SCMP's editorials on

the Wang and Jiang cases brings about a more encouraging sign.

Despite their

differences in nature and the controversies over the latter two dailies' changing political
stances, all of the three papers showed their strong support for press freedom in their

editorials. They reached a consensus that Wang Fengchao's remarks on Taiwan reports
and President Jiang's accusation of the SAR journalists for asking simple and nai've
questions, were not acceptable. Ming Pao was almost as assertive as Apple Daily when
criticising Wang's advice and defending the professionalism of the Hong Kong
journalists. While the SCMP did not explicitly express its disagreement with the two

Chinese officials, the subtle objection was noticeable.

Hong Kong's resistance to China's interference in press freedom is largely due
to the significance of preserving a free press in the territory. This can be examined from
social, political and economic perspectives. From the social point of view, press
freedom is essential to enhance the SAR reporters' confidence in the local journalistic
circle. Aside from the existing unsatisfactory working conditions like low pay, the lack

of autonomy caused by Beijing's intervention is observed to be another factor that
frustrates journalists and encourages them to leave the profession. In fact, China's
respect for rights and freedoms of all kinds would not only prevent a loss of good
journalists, but also a loss of other skilled and talented local professionals, many of
whom have left Hong Kong after being unnerved by the Tiananmen Square massacre in
1989.
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Conclusion

The Tiananmen Square massacre on one hand shook Hongkongcrs' confidence
in the Chinese government.

However, it also began their political awakening and

deepened their desire for democracy. Many post-Tiananmen studies and real-life cases
have shown that the people of Hong Kong have become bolder and more assertive when

it comes to defending their liberties. Thus, a massive upheaval is likely to result if press
freedom and other guaranteed civil rights were to be taken away. This would endanger
the territory's social and political stability, and hence adversely disrupt its dynamic

economy. Some observers point out that stability, together with the climate of freedom
and the free market economy in Hong Kong, are the main factors attracting foreign
investments.

In particular, a free press that provides uncensored and accurate

information plays a vital role in maintaining the investors' trust and confidence in the
territory. It also serves as a reliable source on China news for overseas Chinese.
Moreover, with Singapore's challenge for the status as the regional media centre and
China's Iiberalisation of its economy, press freedom seems to be one of the main
safeguards to sustain the SAR's competitive edge.

Apart from understanding the importance of preserving press freedom in Hong
Kong, it is necessary for China and the SAR to develop a better understanding of each

other, in order to put an end to the 'tug-of-war'. Based on its own economic success
and political stability achieved under colonial rule, it is understandable that Hong Kong

tends to believe that certain western values such as the capitalist system and respect for
'human rights' are universal and would be good for China as well. However, China has

various reasons to reject this belief. It has achieved steady and remarkable economic

growth under a socialist system in recent years. Moreover, as a republic, the western
concept of inalienable 'human rights' has no legal weight in China.

Without realising the

'non-universality'

of western

liberal concepts,

Hongkongers have consistently called for speedier democratisation in both the territory
and the mainland.

Well-known for its sensitivity, China has translated their pro-

democracy spirit into an 'anti-nationalistic' sentiment, and hence developed distrust
towards the territory. What also accounts for the development of distrust is that the two
places interpret key terms in different ways.

Together with their anTerent

interpretations of the term 'freedom of the press', their differing perceptions of the

media's social responsibility, partially explain the origins of the 'tug-of-war'. Being

I
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westem-im'1uenced, the SAR media's

r·~rception

of fulfilling their social responsibility

lies in serving as a watchdog of government. They sirongiy oppose taking up the role of
being a government mouthpiece, as which socialist China regards the mainland media.

Despite its preference for socialism, China is integrating into the international
community, stepping towards liberalisation.

With its entry to the World Trade

Organisation and its successful bid for the 2008 Olympics, China will inevitably have to

inure itself to certain western liberal concepts, including press freedom. This provides
an optimistic view of the 'tug-of-war', bringing a silver lining to the cloud that seems to
hover over the future of press freedom in Hong Kong.
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